Trade preferences are a key element in industrial countries efforts to assist the integration of the least developed countries (LDCs) into the world economy. This paper provides an initial evaluation of the impact of the EU's recently introduced Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative on the products currently exported by the LDCs. It shows that the changes introduced by the EBA in 2001 are relatively minor for the currently exported products, primarily because over 99 percent of EU imports from the LDCs are in products which the EU had already liberalised and the complete removal of barriers to the key remaining products, rice, sugar and bananas has been delayed. The paper proceeds to look at the role EU preferences to LDCs in general have been playing and could play in assisting the integration of the LDCs. It shows that there is considerable variation across countries in the potential impact that EU preferences can have given current export structures. There is a group of the LDCs for whom EU trade preferences on existing exports are not significant since these exports are mainly of products where the MFN duty is zero. Export diversification is the key issue for these countries. For other LDCs, EU preferences have the potential to provide a more substantial impact on trade. However, the paper shows that only 50 percent of EU imports from non-ACP LDCs which are eligible actually request preferential access to the EU. The prime suspect for this low level of utilization are the rules of origin, both the restrictiveness of the requirements on sufficient processing and the costs and difficulties of providing the necessary documentation. More simple rules of origin are likely to enhance the impact of EU trade preferences both in terms of improving market access and in stimulating diversification towards a broader range of exports.
Introduction
Trade preferences are seen by many as an essential element in integrating the developing countries, and particularly the least developed countries, into the world trading system.
Trade preferences in OECD countries are expected to encourage the importation of products from developing countries, raising the export earnings of these countries, stimulating investment and growth. Initial preference schemes were introduced in the 1970s under the "Generalised System of Tariff Preferences" (GSP). Over the past 3 decades the exports of some of the developing countries, particularly those in east Asia, have grown strongly. However, export success has not been uniform and some developing countries, those at the lowest levels of income, have been left behind. In response there have been a number of recent initiatives in OECD countries to further discriminate in favour of the least developed countries (LDCs). Most notable amongst these are the EU's Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the US. This paper takes a look at the initial impact of the EBA, which came into effect in March 2001, although as we shall show the vast majority of imports from the LDCs were already entering the EU duty and quota free. The impact of the changes introduced in 2001 on the products currently exported were therefore relatively minor and as such they should be seen as the final, but small, step in a longer term process that the EU has implemented to provide complete duty and quota free access to the LDCs. The paper goes on to look more broadly at the impact of EU preferences and seeks to assess the scope, actual and potential, that the EBA, broadly defined as covering all products with duty free access to the EU, can play in integrating the least developed countries into the world economy.
The focus of the paper is on those products currently exported by the LDCs. For a group of the poorest countries it is clear that under current trade structures preferences are of no real value since almost all exports are concentrated in products for which the EU external tariff is zero. For these countries the key issue is to what extent the EU scheme of preferences can assist in stimulating diversification into a broader range of exports. For other countries the value of EU preferences under the current structure of exports is more significant due to a higher export share of dutiable products and the larger magnitude of available preferences. However, it appears that improvements in market access are often constrained by the nature of the rules which govern the granting of preferences. The adoption of more simple rules of origin would be of particular benefit to many of these LDCs. The EBA regulation grants duty-free access to imports of all products from the least developed countries, with the exception of arms and munitions, and without any quantitative restrictions. The EU has argued that "this significantly enhances export opportunities and hence potential income and growth for these countries" (CEC(2002) emphasis added). Liberalisation was immediate except for three products fresh bananas, rice and sugar where tariffs will be gradually reduced to zero (in 2006 for bananas and 2009 for rice and sugar). There are duty-free tariff quotas for rice and sugar which will be increased annually. It is important to note that the majority of products from these countries already received duty free treatment under the GSP or Cotonou Agreement. The EBA proposal extended tariff and quota free access to the EU market to the remaining 919 (of these 44 tariff lines were products with full liberalization delayed) of the 10200 tariff lines. 1 The vast majority of these 919 products are agricultural products, including certain meat products, vegetables, fruits, wines and prepared foodstuffs, such as biscuits and jams.
The Everything But Arms Initiative
An important feature of the EBA is that it is embedded in the EU's GSP scheme and access to the EU market is governed by the rules of that scheme. At present the African and Caribbean countries (ACP) can, if they wish, continue to export to the EU under the Cotonou Agreement, the rules of which governing preferential access are in important aspects different to those of the GSP. This is an issue that we will return to in more detail below. It is important to note that the non-ACP countries can only gain zero duty access to the EU market under the EBA.
A key difference between the EBA and other unilateral preferences granted by the EU is that preferences for the least developed countries are granted for an unlimited period and are not subject to periodic review. This contrasts with the current GSP scheme which will cease at the end of 2004. As such the EBA should provide exporters and investors with greater certainty of market access to the EU and therefore stimulate greater capacity in the production of existing products and an environment conducive to the export of a wider range of products. This is a crucial aspect of the EBA. However, this may be undermined to an extent by the inclusion of a new reason for the temporary suspension of preferences:
"massive increases in imports of products originating in the LDCs in relation to their usual levels of production and export capacity". This could act as a constraint upon large-scale investment that transforms production capacities in a particular country and may limit diversification into new products. preferences in general, on the exports of the least developing countries: first, the coverage of the EBA for each country, that is, the importance of exports which are subject to preferences in relation to total exports to the EU and second, the extent to which the available preferences are actually utilised. On the first point, if a country mainly exports to the EU products that are already subject to zero or low MFN tariffs then the preference scheme will have little direct short-term impact on exports. The key contribution that may arise is if the scheme encourages a degree of export diversification into products where preferential margins remain. As noted above, the EBA is potentially an important step forward in this respect due its unlimited duration. On the second point preferences are only valuable from an economic point of view to the extent that they are actually granted. A scheme which offers preferential access but which contains rules that constrain or prevent delivery of improved access will be of little importance. Table 3 classifies each of the LDCs along these two dimensions on the basis of data on exports to the EU in 2001. We look first at the importance of products for which preferences, whatever their magnitude, are available and allocate countries according to whether such products comprise less than 5 per cent of total exports, for which we deem the initiative to be having no direct impact given the current structure of exports, when such products comprise between 5 and 30 per cent of total exports to the EU we take the initiative to be of low relevance, and when products subject to preferences amount to more than 30 per cent of exports we take the initiative to be of high relevance given current exports. These dimensions are shown in the rows of Table 3 comprise the group for which products subject to preferences account for more than 30 per cent of current exports. The remaining non-ACP countries all fall into this category.
The Potential Impact of EU Trade Preferences with Current Trade Structures
Hence this classification gives a crude first indication of the potential importance of trade preferences for the various ACP countries with current export structures. However, it is important to go further and look at the magnitude of the preferences that are being granted.
This is provided in Figures 2 to 4 which show the average margin of preference in the EU
market if all available preferences were fully utilized (as will be discussed later, this cannot be stressed enough). This was computed as the implicit transfer (the sum across all products of the MFN tariff 6 multiplied by the value of exports) divided by the value of total exports to the EU in 2001. 7 This is equivalent to the trade weighted average tariff that would arise if MFN duties were applied. The three figures group countries according to a perceived insignificant current value of preferences, a potential transfer of less than 1 per cent of the value of exports to the EU, countries for whom the potential value of preferences is currently low, of the order of between 1 and 5 per cent of exports, and countries for whom the current value EU preferences is potentially substantial, that is, equivalent to more than 5 per cent of the value of current exports to the EU. Figure 2 shows the countries where EU preferences are currently insignificant and comprises all 7 countries identified above as having a share of preferential exports in total exports of less than 5 per cent. These countries are joined in this figure by 6 other ACP countries and Bhutan. Whilst these countries exports are characterized by a higher proportion of products which are subject to preferences, the MFN tariffs on these preferences are low. For example, the majority of preferential exports by Mali are hides and skins where the average EU tariff is only 2 per cent. In general, EU preferences for this group of countries are unlikely to being having any substantial impact on exports under current trade structures. Thus, this analysis shows the vastly different impact that EU trade preferences can potentially make for the various LDCs which are eligible for duty and quota free access to the EU market under the current structures of exports of these countries. For a group of the ACP countries EU preferences are not significant with the products currently exported. For countries such as Chad and Liberia the potential value of EU preferences currently amounts to less than one tenth of one per cent of the value of exports to the EU, reflecting that the structure of exports is dominated by products for which the MFN duty is zero.
However, there are also a number of countries for whom the potential value of EU preferences is currently substantial. The analysis shows a clear distinction between the non-ACP countries on average, for whom preferences are potentially of high significance and the average for the ACP countries, where EU trade preferences are typically much less important under current trade structures. This analysis has been based on the importance of EU preferences if all exports from the LDCs were granted preferential access to the EU market. We now proceed to look at the available information on the actual take-up of preferences under the EBA.
The Utilisation of Preferences
The take-up of preferences is the other key factor which defines the impact of trade schemes such as the EBA. The columns of Table 3 show the allocation of the LDCs according to the share of exports which requested 8 preferential access to the EU market under the EBA in the value of exports which were eligible for preferential access, the later being the value of exports for which the MFN duty is non-zero (with the exception of bananas, rice and sugar). Again we present a crude breakdown according to whether there is no take-up of preferences (exports requesting preferences were less than 5 per cent of the value of exports eligible for preferences), low take-up of preferences (the ratio of requesting zero duty access over eligible between 5 and 30 per cent), and high utilization of preferences (more than 30 per cent of exports eligible for preferences requested to enter the EU market duty free).
It is striking from Table 3 that for almost all of the ACP countries there is no-take up of preferences under the EBA. Lesotho, is a notable exception. In contrast, for the majority of the non-ACP countries there is a high-take up of preferences. We suspect that the very low utilization of preferences under the EBA by the ACP countries reflects that most of the exports from these countries entered the EU under the Cotonou Agreement rather than under the EBA in 2001. This begs the question of why these countries are still using the Cotonou Agreement rather than the EBA to access the EU market. On the one hand this may just reflect the delay in adjusting to the new scheme and also, as we have discussed above, the majority of exports from ACP countries were already entering the EU duty free under Cotonou and at present there is no incentive to change to EBA, particularly given that different documentation is required to use the EBA (Form A) and the Cotonou (EUR1). Although, we noted above, see Table 2 , that even for products where the EBA offers better access than Cotonou there has been no take-up of preferences under EBA.
On the other hand, the lack of use of EBA may reflect some important differences between the two schemes. Most notable amongst these are differences in the rules of origin.
Although, the required degree of processing tends to be the same for each product category, a number of the general rules vary substantially:
that the costs of attaining them exceed their value. The key factors raising the costs of obtaining preferences are the rules of origin and the administrative costs of proving conformity with those rules. There is some suspicion regarding the data provided by the Netherlands which may understate (to an unknown extent) requests for preferences. This will not distort the key findings that are presented.
• Cumulation: Cumulation allows inputs from specified countries to be treated as originating materials. The EBA is contained within the EU's GSP scheme and therefore is governed by the rules of origin specified in the GSP. Under the GSP diagonal cumulation can take place within four regional groupings: ASEAN, CACM, the Andean Community and SAARC. Diagonal cumulation allows originating materials (those which satisfy the EU rules of origin for that product)
from regional partners to be further processed in another country in the group and treated as if the materials were originating in the country where the processing is undertaken. However, this flexibility in sourcing is constrained by the requirement that the value-added in the final stage of production exceeds the highest customs value of any of the inputs used from countries in the regional grouping.
Cumulation under the EBA is not available to the ACP countries. Such cumulation is a possibility for Cambodia and Laos within ASEAN and for Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal within SAARC. Thus, for example, the standard rule of origin states that clothing products must be made from yarn. In other words, the fabric from which the clothes are cut and made-up must be woven in the beneficiary country or the EU. With diagonal cumulation clothing producers in Cambodia can use fabrics from Indonesia (providing they are originating, that is produced from the stage of fibres) and still receive duty free access to the EU. Similarly, producers in Nepal can import originating fabric from India. This provides for slightly more freedom in sourcing decisions than is available under the basic rule of origin. Indian fabrics preferential access to the EU but not at the zero rate (for which Bangladesh is eligible) but at the rate for which India is eligible, which is only a 20 per cent reduction from the MFN rate, that is a tariff of 9.6 per cent.
Under the Cotonou Agreement full cumulation 10 (Inama (2002)) can occur with any of the ACP countries and there is no requirement concerning value-added in the final stage relative to the customs value of inputs used. There is also the possibility for cumulation with South Africa, provided that the value added exceeds the value of materials from South Africa, and with neighbouring non-ACP developing countries, although highly constrained for textile and clothing products. Hence it is possible that ACP countries using materials from other ACP countries qualify for duty free access to the EU market under the Cotonou Agreement but not under the EBA.
• Tolerance Rule/Minimum Processing: Under the EBA non-originating materials which according to the specific rules of origin cannot be used in the manufacture of a product may nevertheless be used provided that their value does not exceed 10 per cent of the ex-works price of the product. Under Cotonou non-originating materials up to a total value of 15 per cent of the ex-works prices can be used.
11
• Fish: For a number of the ACP countries (Angola, Benin, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda) fish are a major export. Although the basic processing rule is the same under the EBA and Cotonou, all products used must be wholly obtained, the 10 The most advanced form of cumulation, full cumulation, allows for any working or processing (even if it does not confer origin) undertaken in one country to be carried forward to another country and counted as if it were undertaken in the country of final processing. For example, a clothing product made in one country from fabric produced in an regional partner which in turn was made from non-originating yarn would be eligible for duty free access to the EU under full cumulation but not under diagonal cumulation since the fabric would not be deemed to be originating (the rule of origin for the fabric requires manufacture from fibres). 11 In both cases this is predicated on specific rules on maximum values of non-originating materials not being violated. For example, the rule of origin for preparations of vegetables, fruits etc preserved by sugar (HS 2006) requires that materials of Chapter 17 (sugar) do not exceed 30 per cent of the ex-works price.
conditions pertaining to the vessels which catch the fish are more liberal under
Cotonou (see Annex 1).
Hence there are a number of reasons why the ACP countries may not be utilizing the duty free preferences under the EBA and are still using the Cotonou Agreement to access the EU market.
For the non-ACP LDCs we can analyse the issue of the take-up of preferences in more detail since exports from these countries can only achieve duty-free access to the EU market under the EBA. Given our data on the amount of exports eligible for preferences which actually requested duty free access we can derive (the lower bound on) the amount of exports which actually pays the MFN duty rate. These are the data that were presented in Figures 3 and 4 . Thus, on average the EBA could deliver a transfer equivalent to 11 per cent of the exports of the non-ACP LDCs in 2001.
The final column shows the transfer foregone as a proportion of exports to the EU which is equivalent to the trade weighted average tariff that the exports of these countries actually faced. The difference between the two columns shows that value of the transfer actually made as a proportion of exports to the EU. For Bangladesh, the EBA led to a transfer (or a margin of preference) equivalent to 5.65 per cent. However, the lack of full utilization of the available preferences entails that Bangladesh faced a trade-weighted average tariff of 5.8 per cent, which is far in excess of the trade-weighted average tariffs paid by many nonpreferential exporters to the EU! Cambodia, Laos and the Maldives all faced relatively high average tariffs when exporting to the EU after taking into account that only a proportion of exports could have entered the EU duty free.
If we assume that the same factors which constrain the take-up of preferences by non ACP countries also afflict the ACP countries and that the utilization of preferences by the ACP countries was on average similar to that of the non-ACP countries then the value of EU preferences under current export structures becomes even less for these countries with an implicit transfer of around 1 per cent of the value of exports to the EU in 2001. Brenton and Manchin (2003) argue that the prime suspects for the lack of utilization of EU trade preferences are the rules of origin, both in terms of the nature of the rules defining specific processing requirements, with the constraints that this entails for international sourcing from the lowest cost locations, and the costs of providing the necessary documentation to prove conformity with the rules. The costs of documentation related to the rules of origin are compounded by the requirement that goods for which preferences are requested are shipped directly to the EU and that if they are in transit through another country, which will be the case for most of the LDCs, then documentary evidence must be provided to show that the goods remained under the supervision of the customs authorities of the country of transit, did not enter the domestic market there and did not undergo operations other than unloading and reloading. In practice it may be very difficult to obtain the necessary documentation.
Reasons for the Under-Utilisation of Preferences
Rules of origin are required to prevent trade deflection, whereby products from nonbeneficiary countries are re-directed through LDCs to exploit the preferences that are available. This is indeed necessary but the rules of origin should be no stricter than is required to fulfill this function. Rules of origin which are more strict than is necessary will act to protect producers in the preference granting country and undermine the value of the preference scheme for the LDCs. Unfortunately there appears to be no analytical work that assesses the optimal rule of origin from a practical point of view that would prevent trade deflection. One suspects that in most cases a simple change of tariff heading would suffice, compared to the complex rules in most preferential trade schemes.
The fact that only a proportion of exports which are eligible for preferences are requesting preferences suggests that much more than trade deflection is at hand. Deflected trade would request preferences. This in turn suggests that on average 50 per cent of recorded exports from the non-ACP LDCs which are eligible for zero duty access to the EU market and which are not deflected trade from non-eligible countries are not getting that preferential access. If the reason for this lack of take-up of preferences is inability to satisfy the rules of origin or the high costs of proving origin, which are the prime suspects, then clearly the rules are restrictive relative to the objective of preventing trade deflection.
A reason which has been used to justify strict rules of origin is that they encourage the development of integrated production structures within developing countries to maximize the impact on employment and to ensure that it is not just low value-added activities which are undertaken in the LDCs. This is not a reasonable justification for the strict rules of origin that are applied by the EU and the other OECD countries. First, such rules discriminate against small countries where the possibilities for local sourcing are limited or non-existent (Hewitt et al (1995) ). Since most LDCs are small countries they are particularly disadvantaged by restrictive rules of origin relative to larger developing countries. Regional cumulation provisions have been introduced to reduce the constraining effect of the current rules of origin. Nevertheless, they still hamper the choice of sourcing, the ACP countries can source materials from each other but not from low-cost locations in Asia, for example, and as noted earlier there are further restrictions, in terms of valueadded requirements on the extent to which cumulation can be used.
Second, there is no evidence that strict rules of origin over the past 20 years have done anything to stimulate the development of integrated production structures in developing countries. Third, this argument would be much more convincing if the rules of origin were defined by a process of discussion with the developing countries to identify what would be appropriate. They are not. They are defined and imposed by the EU, the US and so on. It seems very difficult to argue that the double or triple processing requirements (yarn or fibre forward rules) that dominate both EU and US preference schemes were introduced for the benefit of textile producers in developing countries as opposed to the benefit of textile producers in the EU and US. Finally, globalisation and the splitting up of the production chain does not allow the luxury of being able to establish integrated production structures within countries. Strict rules of origin act to constrain the ability of firms in LDCs to integrate into these global production networks and in effect act to dampen the location of any value-added activities in these countries.
Conclusions
The EBA initiative is an important step forward in the treatment of products from LDCs in the EU market. It sends a clear signal that all products from LDCs will be eligible for duty and quota free access to the EU market and that such access will be maintained indefinitely.
13 This is where the main impact of the changes introduced by the EBA will be felt in the future, that is, in the extent to which they provide for the diversification of the exports of LDCs, which has been so lacking in the past. Such a policy should be more broadly adopted by all OECD countries, preferably bound under the auspices of the WTO and with a common and more liberal approach to rules of origin.
The direct impact of the EBA in 2001 was negligible since a very small proportion of exports from the LDCs was involved and for the least developed ACP countries even those products which were eligible for improved access did not enter the EU market under the EBA. The principle impact of the changes introduced by the EU in 2001 on products currently exported will arise for products for which full liberalization was delayed:
bananas, sugar and rice. However, these products are important only for a minority of the LDCs and accounted for just a half of one percent of the exports to the EU of the LDCs as a group in 2001.
For a number of the least developed ACP countries, under current export structures EU tariff preferences in general can play nothing more than a minor role in integrating these countries into the world economy. The average tariff that these countries would pay if preferences were removed, the average margin of preference, is less than 1 per cent. Thus, for these countries the paramount trade policy issue is that of trade diversification rather than that of market access for the bundle of products currently exported. For trade preferences in the EU to be of real value they must facilitate the export of a broader range of goods.
The lack of trade diversification of many LDCs despite duty free access to the EU for more than a decade for the vast majority of tariff lines under the Lome Convention and the GSP is not encouraging in this respect. However, the EBA is different since the preferences are not time limited, providing greater certainty for investors and traders. It is important that the impact of the EBA on diversification be monitored and constraints on the export of a broader range of products identified and alleviated. In many cases supply constraints are drastic and it is these which should be the focus of trade-related technical assistance.
Nevertheless, with the preference scheme attention needs to focus on the rules of origin and the extent to which these limit the possibilities for export diversification. The rules of origin are particularly restrictive for simple manufactured products, such as clothing, and for processed food products, precisely those manufactured products where export diversification maybe feasible for these LDCs. This group of countries stands out as a case for the current complex rules of origin to be replaced with a more simple requirement to confer origin for all products, such as change of tariff heading. For other LDCs, EU preferences are of more significance under current export structures by providing a more substantial margin of preference. However, the available evidence from the non-ACP countries suggests that there are constraints upon the ability of these LDCs to fully exploit the available preferences in the EU market.
So, although EU trade preferences do entail a significant margin of preferences for many of the LDCs the full potential of the scheme is not being realized. The under utilization of preferences, which we believe is due to difficulties in satisfying the rules of origin, entails that a substantial proportion of exports of LDCs to the EU pay the full MFN tariff. • Under the EBA the vessel must be registered in the beneficiary country or the EU. Under Cotonou the vessel must be registered in the EU or any ACP state.
• Under the EBA the vessel must sail under the flag of the beneficiary country or the EU. Under Cotonou the vessel must sail under the flag of any ACP country or the EU.
• Under the EBA the vessels must be at least 50 per cent owned by nationals of the beneficiary country or the EU or by companies with a head office in either the beneficiary or an EU state of which the chairman and the majority of the board members are nationals of those countries. Under Cotonou these provisions are extended to cover all ACP states. Under certain conditions the EU will accept vessels chartered or leased by the ACP state under the Cotonou Agreement.
• Under the EBA the master and officers must be nationals of the beneficiary country or an EU member and at least 75 per cent of the crew must be nationals of the beneficiary country or the EU. Under Cotonou 50 per cent of the crew, and the master and officers must be nationals of any ACP state or the EU. * The number in brackets is the value of exports in products liberalized under the EBA but which were not recorded as being eligible for EBA preferences in EU customs statistics. One possibility is that imports entered the EU in the first two months of the year prior to the implementation of the EBA. However, cursory investigation for some of these products suggests that imports occurred throughout the year. Mis-recording of the data is also possible but maybe worth investigating whether imports of these products were denied preferences to which they were eligible. No Relevance of EBA -Exports eligible for preferences < 5% of total exports to the EU Low Relevance of EBA -5%< Exports eligible for preferences < 30% of total exports to the EU High Relevance of EBA -Exports eligible for preferences >30% of total exports to the EU No take-up of preferences -exports requesting preferences < 5% of exports eligible for preferences Low take-up of preferences -5% < exports requesting preferences < 30% of export eligible for preferences High take-up of preferences -exports requesting preferences >30% of exports eligible for preferences The non-ACP LDCs are shaded in yellow. 
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